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Given the Romantic-era fascination with the figure of the idiot—as evidenced, for 
instance, in Wordsworth’s lyrical ballad “The Idiot Boy” (1798), and, in fashion, the “idiot 
sleeve,” ostensibly so named for being designed after the straightjacket used in madhouses at the 
time—it is perhaps not entirely surprising to find in that period and the next a number of 
defenses of stupidity of one kind or another. Though a concept of stupidity had been around for a 
long time—from the Latin stupidus or stupēre, to be stupid meant to be stunned or benumbed, as 
in struck dumb by surprise or grief—the term was before the nineteenth century rarely in use. 
Although Alexander Pope’s The Dunciad, whose four volumes were published between 1728-
1743, seems obviously to be about what we might now class as stupidity—we hear in the poem 
of dunces, ignorance, buffoonery, “Folly and “Dulness” (both personified), nonsense and 
absurdity, “Maggots” (essentially, bad ideas), “Emptiness,” coxcombs, asses, and jades, 
“monkey-mimics,” “a brain of feathers,” and—the most closely related terms—“stupefaction” 
and “stupefied” (one figure is “stupefied to stone”)—stupidity is mentioned by name only in 
footnotes, twice referring to critics, and once, more significantly, where it is a lesser evil as 
compared to Dulness. Here are the lines in the poem to which the note in question refers. The 
note reads: “Dulness here is not to be taken contractedly for mere stupidity, but in the enlarged 
sense of the word, for all slowness of apprehension, shortness of sight, or imperfect sense of 
things. It includes . . . labour, industry, and some degree of activity and boldness – a ruling 
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principle not inert, but turning topsy-turvy the understanding, and inducing an anarchy or 
confused state of mind” (note 7 Book 1). Here “dulness” is an active force, industriously 
affecting body and mind, while stupidity is, by comparison, “inert”: less thoroughgoing and 
vigorous.  
We can compare this to Milton’s Paradise Lost (1667), where the term stupid appears 
twice, most remarkably in Book 9, at a moment when Satan travels to earth. Finding a serpent 
asleep on the grass, Satan enters into its body, “at its mouth,” whereupon “his brutal sense, / In 
heart or head, possessing, soon inspired / With act intelligential” [and it’s worth noting here that 
it is isn’t clear where “brutal sense” resides, or where the “act intelligential” takes place—in the 
heart, or in the head?]. Satan spies Eve, alone in a dense thicket of trees, and so struck is he by 
the loveliness of the scene, and by her pleasure in it, that he is momentarily stunned out of his 
hateful purpose. “That space the Evil one abstracted stood/ From his own evil, and for the time 
remaind / Stupidly good, of enmitie disarm’d, / Of guile, of hate, of envie, of revenge.” Here 
Milton draws on that earlier idea of stupidity, not as intellectual, but as embodied (the OED lists 
among its earliest uses in English, from 1607, “stupidity and dulnesse of the teeth”). Satan’s 
“stupidly good” is therefore like the Popean variety in that it is a kind of contraction of force, an 
abstraction from the normal energies that propel the self, which are, in this case, moral and 
emotional (hate, envy, revenge). “Stupidly good,” Satan seems for moment to be something 
other than himself, either because he feels nothing, or because he is nothing but feeling, in an 
experience he cannot comprehend.   
In today’s talk I will be emphasizing characterizations of stupidity that bring to the fore 
these features of its history: not an idea of stupidity as intellectual deficit only (or even at all), 
but rather as a form of embodiment: physiological and involving encounters with felt, lived 
3 
 
environments. Stupidity here is more like the “astonishment” Descartes describes in The 
Passions of the Soul (1649), where astonishment is wonder’s feeble alter-ego: while wonder 
prompts investigation and therefore knowledge (wonder is energetic), astonishment freezes the 
person, like a statue, into their first state of perception, so that they cannot progress, cannot know 
more about the astonishing thing than they do at that moment. Satan’s goodness, being stupid, is 
not an active goodness; it cannot move forward or have any real effects, instead locking him into 
this one temporal moment (as the lines “for the time” indicate). Importantly, it was in the 
seventeenth century that stupidity began to be considered materially, as a disease or dysfunction 
of the brain. Thomas Willis’s De animal brutorum (1661 lectures; 1672) went against the 
popular idea that the fool was someone who had been touched by God (an idea lending to fools 
an association with holiness) to argue that some mental debilities were caused by organic brain 
disease, and were therefore perhaps capable of cure. Known now as the father of modern 
neurology, Willis argued that: 
Stupidity . . . signifies the defect of the understanding and judgement, 
nevertheless it is not improperly placed among the diseases of the head or of the 
brain: to wit as much as that eclipse of the superior soul, proceeds from the 
Imagination and the memory [being] injured: and the failing of these depends 
upon the faults of the animal spirits, and of the brain itself.i 
Willis’s contention that, in cases of stupidity, “the brain itself is found to be first in fault,” leads 
him to conclude that persons are stupid 
. . . sometimes [of] an excess of some manifest quality in the brain, as chiefly of 
moisture and cold, for which reason children and aged persons are often wont to 
be affected with a dulness of the senses: sometimes a texture too gross and earthy, 
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so that the spirits cannot easily irradiate it, or make tracts for themselves. To this 
gross texture of the brain some born of rusticks are frequently obnoxious, so that 
in some families looking back up on many generations, you will scarce find one 
wise or witty man. (498) 
Willis thus distinguishes between folly and stupidity this way: those who suffer folly are “well 
and quick enough,” but lack judgment; by “fooling, and doing, and speaking a great many things 
happily or ridiculously, they move laughter in the standers by.” On the contrary, “those that are 
stupid either by reason of the defects of the imagination, memory, and judgment, neither 
apprehend well, nor nimbly, nor argue well.” They do not make sport, as in folly, but behave 
“blockishly . . . like apes,” and consequently “the simplicity of these is more, who so carry their 
disease in their countenance and gesture. . . . In stupidity, the spirits of their own nature being 
dull and obtuse, and residing in a gross and impervious brain, are not able to exert themselves for 
duly performing the offices of the animal economy” (499).ii It is not only that the stupid “carry 
their disease” in the body—in the brain, but also in expression and behavior—but also that 
stupidity is a measure of bodily exertion and of the body’s fitness to varieties of work. 
Though Willis notes that “Sometimes a fever has cur’d some fools and stupid persons, 
and has rendered them more acute,” the reason being “that the febrile heat sometimes rarefies 
and disperses the mist infecting the brain,” still he concludes: “Therefore, as to the cure of this 
Disease, Stupidity, whether innate, or acquired, if it be not a plain senselessness, and doltishness, 
incapable of all erudition, though it be not usually cur’d, yet it is wont to be amended” through 
the care of “both a Physician and a Tutor” combined (“Of Stupidity or Folly” 500). Stupidity is 
conceived primarily as a defect in memory or imagination caused by an imbalance in brain 
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matter, but its effects have everything to do with material existence. Both educative and medical 
interventions are prescribed. 
I will be arguing today that, where idiocy—at both the beginning and the end of the 
nineteenth century—identified a kind or type of person and, very often, a permanent state, 
stupidity was a more protean and democratic term: not permanent, not a human type, but a 
condition or sensation into which one can, indeed will, from time to time, fall. This is not to say 
that the idea of the type went away: the perpetual idiot of the Romantic variety—Wordsworth’s 
idiot boy or Charles Dickens’s Barnaby Rudge (published 1841, set during the Gordon Riots of 
1780)—or the moral idiot, like Thackeray’s Barry Lyndon (1844), someone congenitally stuck in 
an unchanging mental or moral state, persists. And with the advent of eugenics at the end of the 
century, this idea returns, if in altered form, in such works as Lewis Terman’s 1906 PhD thesis, 
Genius and Stupidity: A Study of Some of the Intellectual Processes of Seven ‘Bright’ and Seven 
‘Stupid’ Boys, or Henry Herbert Goddard’s system of “mental ages,” with “morons” having the 
mental ages of between 8-12 years, “imbeciles” 3-7 years, and the “idiot” under 2. In fact, 
stupidity was the object of intensive study well into the twentieth century (in Britain, America, 
and France) and was treated with scientific seriousness. Stupidity afflicted groups, and the idea 
was to determine the cause. For instance, Walter B. Pitkin, staunch eugenicist and self-
proclaimed acolyte of Samuel Smiles, published A Short Introduction to the History of Human 
Stupidity in 1932, arguing that technological innovation causes tasks to be performed more 
efficiently, and so cut down on the number of people needed to do them, resulting in an 
“appalling surplus of Stupids and Humanesques, relative to jobs which utilize their low abilities” 
(4). A similar argument appears in John Fischer’s The Stupidity Problem and Other Harassments 
of 1948, which claims that once physical labor is made obsolete, a “dim-witted” majority is 
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deprived of traditional means of employment. No longer useful as laboring bodies, those 
afflicted with the stupidity problem become parasitic on the general good. The intelligent also 
suffer, “liv[ing] in frustration, because they can [find] no work equal to their talents” (73). 
Finally, the psychoanalyst William Bergler writes in The Talent for Stupidity (1952) of a 
category of people he describes as “injustice collectors”: people who complain of (imagined) 
continual mistreatment by others, not realizing—and this is their stupidity—that they 
unconsciously seek out punishment, so as to savor masochistically in their own defeat. Bergler 
describes this “common-place spectacle of pronounced ‘dumbness’ [as] an attribute of the 
normal intelligence”: “the end of the old-fashioned concept of ‘stupidity,’” he writes, “is 
foreshadowed by the emergence of a scientific understanding of neuroticism affecting the 
intellectual sphere,” he writes; stupidity is “a neurotic symptom and sign” (xxxv). Although 
Bergler’s stupidity-as-neurosis is not identical to the enervating “Stupids” of Pitkin or Fisher, it 
does describe a category of persons (injustice collectors) in need of medical (or, psychological) 
intervention. And their malady is “common-place.” Indeed—and this is where Bergler differs 
most from these others—stupidity is an “attribute of the normal intelligence.” It is something 
that can or might affect us.    
So—between Milton and Pope at the one end, and Bergler on the other, Britons had an 
increasing lot to say about stupidity. This includes major authors, such as George Eliot and 
Henry James: the term “stupidity” (in one form or another) appears some 47 times in 
Middlemarch (1871), and 28 times in The Golden Bowl (1904). In neither of these texts is 
stupidity confined to idiots. Meanwhile Tennyson, whom Auden called “undoubtedly the 
stupidest” of the English poets, set about inventing neologisms, such as “stupid-wild” (in Becket, 
1884) and “stupid-honest” (in Harold, 1876). We will now look at a few lesser examples, from 
7 
 
the periodical press, which will help to establish this movement away from the idea of the fixed 
human type, the individual (as in the Romantic “idiot”) and the messier, widespread, group or 
national stupidity that comes into being over the course of the nineteenth century. “Ode to 
Stupidity,” by one “Mr. Hole,” published December 1792 in the Universal Magazine of 
Knowledge and Pleasure (and reprinted, the following year, in the Weekly Entertainer), offers its 
“languid song” to a power that “deadens each active power of soul” and blunts “the thinking 
mind”: “This state of Dulness realiz’d, / Is to be envied, not despis’d,” the speaker says. The 
poem’s central claim is that stupidity, an “unfeeling Folly,” blocks pain; this stupefaction has 
certain benefits, melancholic though they may be. It produces “calm Indifference” to the many 
causes or signs of suffering: the pricks of want, the orphan’s cry, death, the widow’s tears. And it 
obliterates the pains of memory: former ills and future worry “are nothing, if forgot.” Stupidity 
offers here a kind of easeful oblivion, a mode of escape. In my next example, the mode is 
decidedly more comic, and the scene has changed. “The Pleasures of Stupidity, by an Etourdi,” 
published in The Inspector and National Magazine in 1827, contrasts an older form of stupidity 
to a new. The old version, in “the extravaganza style,” follows the conventional notions of the 
idiot: “a lank, slovenly, shoetieless, moon-visaged fellow, whose eyes seem daily traveling back 
into his cranium; a sleepiness, a mistiness, the spirit of downright dullardism playing over his 
face” (52). The newer, pleasurable variety, on the other hand, is neither slovenly nor atavistic, 
but belongs to the city set, to modern men about town. It is not anti-intellectual: “I have a decent 
quantum of intellectual fulgor in mine eye-balls,” the author explains. A coping mechanism that 
provides “escapes from what would have been painful”—namely, drawing-room conversation, 
with its pompously stylized talk, in-jokes, and the “waggeries of town-taught wisdom” (53)—
stupidity here manifests as a cultivated imperviousness to energetic, empty banter, town talk, 
8 
 
innuendo, and volleys of wit (52). Energy is once again a central feature of the experience of 
stupidity, but here it is the world that moves—and talks—too fast and too much, and stupidity as 
an adaptation—a learned stance or habit—is the antidote.   
An idea of stupidity as a national problem becomes more pronounced as the century 
wears on. “Has not everything which is distinctively characteristic of English habits, English 
enthusiasms, and English panics something more than a touch of stupidity in it?” asks the author 
of “The Future of Stupidity,” published in 1858 in the Saturday Review; “What is to become of 
the Stupid Men in the next generation?” (249). The author goes on to identify the problem, which 
has to do with fitness to work and with education, specifically the “examination system,” 
including the civil service exam (introduced in 1858) that, “falling like a blight on the fat face of 
Stupidity,” prevents hearty Englishmen from obtaining jobs (ibid). “It was at Oxford and 
Cambridge that the disease began which has since spread over England, and afflicted every 
variety of the human vegetable,” the author says:  
Boards and Commissions were established, who examined youths whom they had 
not educated, and then guaranteed their fitness or unfitness for every human 
pursuit and calling. . . . And now, in the course of the last few weeks, the fell 
pestilence has made a sudden leap and buried itself in the very entrails of the 
English society. The great middle class—the bulwark, the fortress, the continuing 
city of British Stupidity—has been invaded . . . .  Youths who, six months ago, 
looked forward with well-founded confidence to the post of drapers’ assistant . . . 
have had their fond hopes dashed and their career destroyed at the outset. A 
happier aspirant, with the certificate of A.A. in his pocket, has stepped proudly 
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behind the counter, and the rejected candidate turns away in bitter despair, 
thinking he would surely enlist if he were sure there was no entrance exam. (ibid)  
The author’s lament that decimals training has become the order of the day, leaving little time for 
ponies, points to anxiety about the enfeeblement of the English national body. The article 
concludes: “The muscles are, after all, with the stupid men” (250). Like this author, the author of 
a different essay, “The Philosophy of Stupidity” (published in The Scottish Review in 1882), 
makes the similar case that stupidity is behavioral, and that it is learned: “This possibility of 
artificially producing stupidity,” he writes, “is the special reason why the defect is worth careful 
attention” (“333). Perhaps it is little wonder, then, that in 1932 Pitkin could declare: “a thorough 
inquiry into stupid people and their acts has become a major issue of statesmanship.” It was 
hardly a new idea by then, and would instead have been familiar to the Victorians, of which he, 
having been born in 1878, was one.     
 
PART II: Acts Intelligential 
 
For the rest of my time I will be focusing on a few of the ideas raised thus far: an idea of 
stupidity as embodied, involving both feeling and energy, in varying degrees, and having also to 
do with degrees of activity and spheres of labor. Additionally, I will be thinking of stupidity as 
afflicting groups (this might be physiological, psychological, or sociocultural and environmental, 
or some messy combination of these)—and as capable of cure, but also, as I want now to 
emphasize, as potentially of value—not a disease to be remedied but advantageous, or at the very 
least useful, or—if we want to get down to it—a fact of life, and so something people have to 
find ways to live with. Rather than the escapist, individuated pleasures of the “Ode to Stupidity,” 
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however, I’m going to be more interested here in collectivities and habits learned. And so we 
will make our way back to Samuel Smiles, and arrive—at long last!—at the first of my title’s 
dull boys: 
Hence it happens that the men who have most moved the world, have not been so 
much men of genius, strictly so called, as men of intense mediocre abilities, and 
untiring perseverance; not so often the gifted, of naturally bright and shining 
qualities, as those who have applied themselves diligently to their work, in 
whatsoever line that might lie.  “Alas!” said a widow, speaking of her brilliant but 
careless son, “he has not the gift of continuance.”  Wanting in perseverance, such 
volatile natures are outstripped in the race of life by the diligent and even the dull. 
“Che va piano, va longano, e va lontano,” says the Italian proverb: Who goes 
slowly, goes long, and goes far.    
 
Hogarth, though a very dull boy at his lessons, took pleasure in making drawings 
of the letters of the alphabet, and his school exercises were more remarkable for 
the ornaments with which he embellished them, than for the matter of the 
exercises themselves. In the latter respect he was beaten by all the blockheads of 
the school, but in his adornments he stood alone. His father put him apprentice to 
a silversmith, where he learnt to draw, and also to engrave spoons and forks with 
crests and ciphers. From silver-chasing, he went on to teach himself engraving on 
copper, principally griffins and monsters of heraldry, in the course of which 
practice he became ambitious to delineate the varieties of human character. The 
singular excellence which he reached in this art, was mainly the result of careful 
observation and study.                                         Samuel Smiles, Self-Help (1859) 
 
Self-Help is a paean to dullness. Along with Hogarth (“a very dull boy at his lessons”), Sir 
Walter Scott, Joshua Reynolds, and William Blake are also, in this book, represented as dull. So 
too the painters Edward Bird, Claude Lorraine, J.M.W. Turner, and William Etty, who was 
“looked upon by his fellow students as a worthy but dull, plodding person.” As was missionary 
John Williams, “the martyr of Erromango,” who was “considered a dull boy,” and Sir Thomas 
Fowell Buxton, M.P., once “a dull, heavy boy, distinguished for his strong self-will”; or indeed 
Sir Isaac Newton, who, “though a comparatively dull scholar, . . . was very assiduous in the use 
of his saw, hammer, and hatchet.” Dullness here means something like stupidity as we 
understand the term today: unlike lofty, “bright and shining” genius or “brilliance,” dullness is 
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plodding, slow, persevering in earthly, bodily acts. For Smiles, though, this dullness is good. 
Where genius lacks “continuance”—it dazzles energetically, then flames out—dull boys working 
at dull things become self-trained, serious men. As in the famous case of Turtle v. Hare, 
slowness wins the race. “The maxim is often quoted of ‘All work and no play makes Jack a dull 
boy,’” Smiles tells us; “but all play and no work makes him something greatly worse.”iii 
Dullness and stupidity, as we have seen, share meaning. Dullness in the OED is “Not 
quick in intelligence or mental perception; slow of understanding; not sharp of wit; obtuse, 
stupid, inapprehensive.” Like stupere and stupidus, dullness involves embodiment, a want of 
“sensibility or keenness of perception in the bodily senses and feelings”; “of pain or other 
sensation: not keen or intense.” Dullness might name an atrophied or attenuated sensibility, a 
feeling less than; or it might name something felt in an ongoing way, not keenly but habitually, 
as in a dull ache or pain. Like stupidity, dullness is slow and low, temporally and energetically: 
“not brisk; inert, sluggish, inactive; heavy, drowsy.” As an aspect of mood, it involves the 
blunting of spirits, depression, melancholy, and “gloom.” These two terms—dullness and 
stupidity—seem to have been more or less interchangeable in 1833 when, in Illustrations of 
Political Economy, Harriet Martineau wrote of a boy named Temmy, “He was rather a dull 
child—usually called uncommonly stupid.”iv Temmy seems congenitally slow after the fashion 
of the Romantic idiot, yet Martineau tells us that his stupidity is in fact an effect of power: “uncle 
Arthur was full of indignation at Temple for cowing the child’s spirit, and thus blunting his 
intellect,” she writes. Temmy has become stupid, having suffered mistreatment at the hands of 
his rich, slave-owning father. The cause isn’t brain defect but emotional abuse. 
Such a stupidity is less strictly a matter of intellect alone than something experienced, 
involving feeling—emotion, but also organs and skin. This understanding of stupidity as 
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embodied prompts us to consider it less a matter of individual I.Q.—that association hardens 
only with eugenics—and more like those things that today we call affects, transmissible between 
bodies in the manner of what Anne Cvetokovich has called “public feeling”: shareable and felt 
by groups (especially politically marginalized groups).v As Kathleen Stewart observes in her 
book Ordinary Affects, “power is a thing of the senses. It lives as a capacity, or a yearning, or a 
festering resentment” (85-6). According to Stewart, all affects, even ordinary ones, involve 
relational performances of power and its absence.vi They involve publics. As Spinoza has it: “in 
affect, we are never alone” (Massumi’s gloss, The Politics of Affect, 6).    
 So what happens if we begin to treat stupidity in ways similar to some of the ways that 
we have begun of late to think about affect? Along with Cvetkovich and Stewart, we might 
consider Elizabeth Wilson’s Gut Feminism, which sees depression as an affliction of mind and 
stomach—“the gut is an organ of mind,” she says; “it ruminates, deliberates, comprehends” 
(5)—or Teresa Brennan’s The Transmission of Affect, which sees affects as coming in from 
outside of us, generated by the bodies of others and registering in us as felt and experienced 
shifts in mood even when they do not rise to the level of consciousness or acquire names. It 
doesn’t really matter (to me) whether or not it is scientifically true that we can, as Brennan 
believes, “smell” affects (she speculates that they are transmitted by way of pheromones), but 
that this idea of affects as “profoundly social” leads back to older ways of conceiving the self 
(68). Critiquing an Enlightenment notion of the bounded self—a body with borders, its emotions 
generated from within—Brennan returns to pre-eighteenth-century discourses of the passions to 
suggest that these earlier theories got something right that we now get wrong: that affects are 
transmissible through bodily proximity to others, not so much emanating from our minds but 
entering our skins.vii This return to and reconception of the permeable body is in keeping with 
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other recent work on what Kyla Schuller calls “the biopolitics of feeling,” which reconsiders 
such concepts as sentimentality as involving “more than an exchange of ideas and emotions,” for 
it involves, as she says, “a form of embodiment, a ‘bodily bond’” with others and with the 
outside world (citing Glenn Hendler, 3). Here “bodies not only flow into each other via their 
inlets; impressibility also adheres each body to the population, such that common influences 
forge common desires and instincts”: “the flow of unconscious influences forges individuals into 
‘a general mass’” (she is citing Horace Bushnell’s 1852 tract Unconscious Influences, [9]). The 
impressible body is, in this account, “a biopolitical effect,” in that the discourses of 
sentimentalism generate “a broad regulatory technology” dividing those who feel properly from 
those who don’t (9). Affect “depends on the notion of an impaired relationality as its constitutive 
outside,” she writes; it depends on its “definitional opposite, debility, for theoretical solidity” 
(13). The same is true of a concept like intelligence, which depends on its definitional opposite, 
stupidity. Except that, as we have seen, stupidity has not always been seen to be the reverse of 
intelligence, nor its absence, but can name instead a range of experiences of the material or 
phenomenological world. These paired concepts, then—intelligence and stupidity or dullness, 
good feeling and bad or disabled feeling—are more than just structurally alike. They are, and 
were for some writers in the nineteenth century, co-constitutive concepts, mutually 
interdependent and defining.   
  I want to turn now to another text with bearing on my claim that stupidity is an affect, 
and that it was conceived as such by some in the nineteenth century. The book is Jacques 
Rancière’s The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation (1987), which 
addresses the tensions of post-1968 France (the student riots) by turning to the story of another 
revolutionary moment, 1815, the year of Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo, and the year when the 
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French schoolteacher Jean Joseph Jacotot was exiled to Belgium, where he went on to develop a 
revolutionary pedagogy while teaching at the University of Louvain. Jacotot’s students spoke 
Flemish; he spoke only French, and so could not teach in the usual ways. He assigned a single 
book—Fenelon’s Telemachus—and invited students to “read” it despite its having been written 
in language they didn’t understand. I will be focusing on just a few aspects of this experimental 
pedagogy, about which Jacotot began publishing in the early 1820s.viii First is Jacotot’s principle 
thesis, that “all men have equal intelligence” (18, original emphasis). That thesis rests on an 
understanding of intelligence not as content, an accumulation of what one knows, but as a power. 
Rancière refers to this power as will, but it is clear that this power is not merely cerebral, and that 
it everywhere involves the vocabularies of sentiment. It is, he says, “the sentiment of the 
inequality of intelligence, the sentiment that distinguishes superior minds only at the price of 
confusing them with universal belief,” that “makes society turn on itself from one age to the 
next” (86). This was true of the Athenian people, whose “stupidity”—and here Rancière uses that 
term—lay in “the feeling of its obvious superiority over the imbecile people of Thebes” (ibid, 
original emphasis). Stupidity is a public feeling. This is why, for Jacotot/Rancière, speaking to 
men as men makes them so. Modes of address, ways of speaking, are what produce “intellectual 
emancipation”: “Knowing is nothing, doing is everything” (Rancière 97, 65, original 
emphasis).ix  
 Defining intelligence as a matter not of what one knows but of what one does, 
Jacotot/Rancière, like Samuel Smiles, emphasizes bodies at work. Groping, “the way children 
move, blindly,” testing and repeating, comparing and verifying results, with “all [one’s] 
exploration . . . strain[ing] toward this”: all of this is “doing” (10-11). Intelligence is represented 
as a capacity for plodding exploration and slow discovery. It is a feeling of one’s way. Here is 
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Jacotot’s “translation” (Rancière’s term) of Descartes’s thought experiment involving a piece of 
wax: 
I want to look and I see. I want to listen and I hear. I want to touch and my arm 
reaches out, wanders along the surfaces of objects of penetrates into their interior; 
my hand opens, develops, extends, closes up; my fingers spread out or move 
together by my obeying my will. In that act of touching, I know only my will to 
touch. That will is neither my hand, nor my brain, nor my touching; that will is 
me . . . . I consider ideation like touching. I have sensations when I like; I order 
my senses to bring them to me; I have ideas when I like; I order my intelligence to 
look for them, to feel. The hand and the intelligence are slaves, each with its own 
attributes. Man is a will served by an intelligence. (54-5)  
Rancière goes on to add that “Idiocy is not a faculty; it is the absence or the slumber or the 
relaxation of intelligence.” In so doing, he reinforces an understanding of hand (body) and 
intelligence (mind) as “doing,” or performing, in similar ways. Both reach out for and “feel”—
feel out and touch—the world (ibid). Indeed body and mind do the same kind of work: 
It’s Menenius Agrippa who is speaking now. And the details of what he is telling 
the plebians matter little. The essential thing is that he is speaking to them, and 
they are listening to him; that they are speaking to him and he hears them. He 
speaks to them about legs and arms and stomachs, and that’s perhaps not very 
flattering. But what he imparts to them is their equality as speaking beings, their 
capacity to understand as soon as they recognize themselves as equally marked by 
the sign of intelligence. He tells them that they are the stomachs—this derives 
from the art learned by studying and repeating, by breaking apart and putting back 
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together others’ speeches. . . . he speaks them as men, and, in so doing, makes 
them into men. (97) 
 And so to the second point. Rancière/Jacotot argue that it is nondemocratic and wrong to 
believe that some people (some students) are smart and knowing, and others ignorant, some 
mature and others unformed. Such a fiction “works by representing inequality in terms of 
velocity—as ‘slowness,’ ‘backwardness,’ ‘delay,’ . . [and] ‘lag,’” such that students can never 
“catch up” to their teachers (Ross, Translator’s Introduction xx). They inhabit a kind of queer 
temporality like that described by Jack Halberstam, Heather Love, and others: perpetually 
backward and behindhand, retarding normal processes, timetables, and clocks.x But here too 
slowness, backwardness—stupidity, if you will—is social and structural rather than personal. For 
Jacotot/Rancière, it is teaching by “explication” that incapacitates students in this way, 
cementing a self-understanding of themselves as perpetually incapable of learning without the 
aid of the schoolmaster, who knows all answers in advance. This incapacitated state is called 
“stultification” in the English translation, but, as the translator Kristin Ross explains: “In the 
absence of a precise English equivalent for the French term abrutir (to render stupid, to treat like 
a brute), I’ve translated it as ‘stultify.’ Stultify carries the connotations of numbing and 
deadening better than the word ‘stupefy,’ which implies a sense of wonderment or amazement 
absent in the French” (7). Unlike the groping learner, feeling her way, the stultified—we might 
say the stupid—child feels only one thing: grief. Power is a thing of the senses. “The child who 
is explained to will devote his intelligence to the work of grieving,” Rancière writes; “to 
understanding that he doesn’t understand unless he is explained to.” This child is stupefied not 
by submission to “the rod” but to a more insidious form of power, “a hierarchical world of 
intelligence” in which he will always feel himself behind and below his intellectual betters (8). 
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Stupidity is here a social position and a measure of power, a ranking low in a hierarchy of 
economic and intellectual inequity.xi But it is also an attitude, indeed a disabling one: a feeling 
that unequal conditions are right.  
Jacotot’s ideas came to England from France by way of the British educationalist Joseph 
Payne, who in 1830 published a study of his work. According to one historian, their (he says, 
limited) popularity in England had to do with the fact that Jacotot’s thesis resembled less “the 
‘environmentalist’ argument that comparable egalitarian philosophies of education” put forward 
at the time “but ha[d] more in common with the ‘self-help’ tradition of writers like Samuel 
Smiles” (Howatt 170).xii It seems plausible to me that this resemblance might be evidence of the 
lastingness of some of Jacotot’s propositions. In Self-Help, for instance, Smiles recounts little 
biographical stories such as that of Samuel Lee, Cambridge professor of Hebrew, who “sold his 
Greek books, and bought Hebrew ones, and learnt that language, unassisted by any instructor, 
without any hope of fame or reward, but simply following the bent of his genius.” Lee learned 
Hebrew from an ignorant schoolmaster: himself.  
Jacotot’s argument that all learning is contained in a single book, since what matters is 
not its content but the methods one uses to make sense of it, was reproduced in England in such 
pamphlets as An Account of Jacotot’s Method of Universal Instruction, by “B. Cornelius, 
Principal of the Pestalozzian School at Epsom,” printed in London in 1830 and reviewed in the 
Athaneaum and elsewhere (Vol. 3 no. 146, 504). “Pestalozzian” means relating to or constituting 
a system of education in which the sense perceptions are first trained and the other faculties are 
then developed in what is held to be natural order, named after Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi 
(1746-1827), a Swiss teacher and educational reformer whose motto was “Learning by head, 
hand and heart” [according to Wikipedia, “thanks to Pestalozzi, illiteracy in 18th-century 
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Switzerland was overcome almost completely by 1830” – he advocated training through GROUP 
exercises and activities, rather than approaches that emphasized individuals]. Cornelius rather 
crankily concedes that, despite Jacotot’s “zealot[ry]” and “arrogant demeanor,” his ideas have 
something in common with Sir Walter Scott’s, who observed that one reason why “such 
numerous instances of erudition occur among lower ranks is that, with the same powers of mind, 
the poor student is limited to a narrow circle for indulging his passion for books, and must 
necessarily make himself master of the few he possesses ere he can acquire more”  (vi, 2-3, 28-
9). Having only a few books can be an asset. In fact, mere sentences will do: “Take, for example, 
a portion of a sentence in the first paragraph . . . and confine yourself to an explanation of it, as 
an instance of predication. At once you open the whole philosophy of language and of logic; the 
mysteries of the subject, the copula and the predicate; the proofs that all science and literature—
in a word, all the productions of the human intellect, are but so many varyings of that simple 
process of predication” (Cornelius 29). In sum: all intelligences are equal; everything one needs 
to know is contained in a single book, perhaps even a single paragraph written in a foreign 
language through which one feels one’s way. Cornelius quotes Buffon in stating: “Genius is but 
an aptitude of patience” (Cornelius 30). It is, like its necessary counterpart, that debility we call 
stupidity, an attitude, a stance, and an embodied, felt experience of the world (in this case, of 
time). Here is Cornelius describing an “improvising” student, feeling—but also losing—his way 
in an oral presentation: “All eyes being fixed on him, he is embarrassed, he stammers, and at 
length becomes dumb. But this is not a defect of genius, it is merely . . . a want of self-
possession. . . . hence he sees nothing that he ought to see; he can compare nothing; he has lost 
the standard by which he ought to measure himself and others; he has lost genius, because he has 
lost the balance of judgment. Hence the first rule of improvisation: Acquire the mastership of 
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your own feelings” (39). Here, to lose one’s “genius” is to perform poorly, to become 
embarrassed—to feel stupid. But this stupidity can be unlearned or, more to the point, undone 
through a change in attitude, bearing: through mastery of the emotional self. 
Cornelius’s Jacotot is not identical to Rancière’s, and no doubt this emphasis on 
emotional mastery would have had different consequences for different classes of people in the 
1820s and 30s. If genius is equivalent to it, women cannot but be stupider—and not just them. In 
the final moments of this talk I want to turn to George Eliot, starting with The Mill on the Floss 
(published in 1860 but set in the 1820s and 1830s), a novel fixated on questions of intellectual 
difference and on what it calls “eddication,” from the moment we learn that Mr. Tulliver chose 
the dullest of the Dodson girls to marry (“I picked the mother because she wasn’t o’er ‘cute . . . . 
I picked her from her sisters o’ purpose ‘cause she was a bit weak, like” [68]), to his desire to 
make his son Tom “a bit of a scholard,” which leads to Tom’s stultifying stint at the Rev. Mr. 
Stelling’s, purveyor of useless Classical training (56). His teacher considers Tom “a thoroughly 
stupid lad,” having a “natural stupidity” (208)—something congenital, inborn—and even 
Tulliver, himself described as “rather a dull fellow” (205), classes Tom among the “stupid lads” 
(69), calling him as “a bit slowish” (59).xiii But it’s not just them. Aunt Deane speaks to all 
children as if they were “deaf or perhaps rather idiotic” (118), Tom calls Maggie “a stupid” twice 
(146); even Phillip Wakem is a “caressed mollusc” (248). Dullness abounds. 
In fact Eliot’s narrator repeatedly, and quasi-satirically, represents the entire era as duller 
than the present, as a time when “ignorance was much more comfortable than at present” (185), 
England populated by “unspeculative minds” (386). Eliot’s commitment to representing what she 
calls the “narrow, ugly, grovelling existence” (362) of people like “those emmet-like Dodsons 
and Tullivers” (363), and her “cruel conviction” that the human lives that make up that “gross 
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sum of obscure vitality . . . will be swept into the same oblivion with the generations of the ants 
and beavers,” involve a recognition that intelligence and dullness are effects and inequivalencies 
of power and so, too, are things of the senses—not measures of intellectual content, in the 
manner of personal I.Q., so much as affective and embodied group responses to biopolitical 
circumstance (362). Eliot worried that “intellectual errors we once fancied were a mere 
incrustation” can grow “into the living body and … cannot in the majority of cases [be] 
wrenche[ed] . . . away without destroying vitality.” This worry demonstrates, I think, an 
understanding of stupidity (or “intellectual error”) as thoroughly embodied: not superficial (as an 
incrustation might be, a hardening of the skin) but integrally bound up in biological life (what 
Eliot calls “vitality”) (letters, Vol 1 p 162). “I am telling the history of very simple people, who 
never had any illuminating doubts as to personal integrity and honor,” Eliot writes (371); but she 
also asks: “How should they know?” (364). The question lends new seriousness to an otherwise 
more comic passage in the novel in which the narrator writes of Tom in Book II, entitled 
“School- Time”: “It is doubtless almost incredible to instructed minds of the present day that a 
boy of twelve, not belonging strictly to ‘the masses’ who are now understood to have the 
monopoly on mental darkness, should have had no distinct idea how there came to be such a 
thing as Latin on this earth” (209). Tom is made so “uncomfortable” by his educational training 
that it is “as if he had been plied with cheese in order to remedy a gastric weakness which 
prevented him from digesting it.” “It is astonishing,” the narrator exclaims, “what a different 
result one gets by changing the metaphor! Once call the brain an intellectual stomach, and one’s 
ingenious conception of the classics and geometry as ploughs and harrows seems to settle 
nothing.” Refiguring the metaphor of the human brain as a field to be sown, this shift to an idea 
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of the brain as “an intellectual stomach” figures the labors of the mind and the body as parallel 
intelligential acts. 
For this reason, I think, moral stupidity is itself not quite as simple a category for Eliot as 
it has sometimes seemed. Here is the famous passage from Middlemarch on the topic:  
Today she [Dorothea] had begun to see that she had been under a wild illusion in 
expecting a response to her feeling from Mr. Casaubon, and she had felt the 
waking of a presentiment that there might be a sad consciousness in his life 
which made as great a need on his side as her own. We are all of us born in moral 
stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves: Dorothea had 
early begun to emerge from that stupidity, but yet it had been easier to her to 
imagine how she would devote herself to Mr. Casaubon, and become wise and 
strong in his strength and wisdom, than to conceive with that distinctness 
which is no longer reflection but feeling – an idea wrought back to the 
directness of sense, like the solidity of objects—that he had an equivalent centre 
of self, whence the lights and shadows must always fall with a certain difference. 
 
Dorothea’s emergence from “moral stupidity” has always been taken to be an advancement in 
her development, away from the self-involvement of the infancy, incapable of distinguishing its 
desires from the world, and toward a recognition of the different experiences of others. That’s 
not wrong. But moral stupidity is less like an encrustation (a false belief) that can be cut off or 
shed, than like a deeper embodiment; any attempt at cutting out the disease, with a scalpel, tends 
to the destruction of life. I tend to see Eliot’s many comparisons of persons to emmets, beavers, 
and ants as indicating that she saw the majority of humankind not (or not only) as benighted and 
belated—intellectually stupid, slow and behindhand, needing to catch up—but as a resource, a 
disabled, embodied vitality that the presumption of intelligence, or even an “intense 
mediocr[ity]” like that described by Samuel Smiles, could begin to enable and tap. Ants and 
beavers are nothing if not energetic. We might, then, take more seriously Mr. Tulliver’s 
frustrated remark that “a perfectly sane intellect is hardly at home in this insane world” (69). 
Stupidity is not so much not-thinking, thinking’s antithesis, but thinking that feels its relation to 
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its own powerlessness (see Birgit Erdle, Adorno essay 266). This “obscure vitality” is a “social 
feeling,” to use Eliot’s own phrase: obscure because hidden to history, as in unrecorded, but also 
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